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The Erosion of the Country of
Origin Effect
A Case Study of a Swedish Multinational
Company
ANNETTE HAYDEN
TONY EDWARDS
Over the last two decades, Swedish capital has undergone a
rapid internationalization. This has presented a significant chal-
lenge to the distinctive nature of the Swedish economy in general
and its employment relations system in particular. A key question
arising is: to what extent, and in what ways, are Swedish multi-
nationals influenced by the distinctiveness of the country of origin
in the way they manage their international workforces? We
investigate these issues through examination of data gathered from
a mini-case study of a large Swedish multinational. We show how
the firm has adopted practices experienced in its foreign opera-
tions and deployed these throughout the corporation. This process
has eroded, though not removed, the influence of the Swedish
system on employment relations in the multinational, with the
British and American systems appearing to exert a growing influ-
ence. We explain the findings with reference to managerial per-
ceptions of the strengths and weaknesses of different “national
business systems.”
The last ten years have witnessed a relentless and rapid rise in levels
of foreign direct investment (FDI). Between 1990 and 1999 the stock of
FDI nearly trebled in value to stand at $4,759 billion (UN 2000). The
driving force behind this has been the wave of cross-border mergers and
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acquisitions, which have increased the size and geographical spread of many
multinational companies (MNCs). MNCs are now widely seen as the
“primary shapers” of the international economy (Dicken 1998) since they
have the potential to shift investment and jobs across borders, influence
aspects of government policy and draw on elements of a range of national
business systems. In these ways, MNCs increase the internationally inte-
grated nature of production and service provision.
The role of MNCs is particularly significant in countries such as
Sweden, which are characterized by a high level of outward FDI. The
process of the internationalization of Swedish capital has picked up pace
over the last two decades, resulting in many large firms holding more assets
outside than inside their country of origin. This has added importance in
the case of Sweden because for most of the post-war period the economy
was highly distinctive: strong economic growth was accompanied by low
levels of inequality; the state played an active role in controlling economic
activity; and employment relations revolved around a highly centralized
system of pay bargaining. The combination of Swedish capital being highly
internationalized and the distinctiveness of the domestic economy means
that Swedish MNCs are a very interesting test case of the way in which
MNCs are embedded in and shaped by their country of origin. To what
extent and in what ways are Swedish MNCs influenced by the distinctive-
ness of the country of origin in the way they manage their international
workforces? How has this country of origin effect evolved as FDI has
increased? In particular, how has it been eroded by the adoption of practices
that originated in other systems of employment relations?
These questions are important for a number of reasons. For manage-
ment, there is growing evidence that MNCs are seeking greater integration
in their international operations, including their approach to employment
relations. A key issue for managers, therefore, is the form that this takes:
the extent to which it is based on the practices operating in the distinctive
Swedish system, or alternatively on practices characteristic of other systems.
Employees and their representatives in the domestic operations of Swedish
MNCs are also interested parties to this process. If the country of origin
effect remains strong then there is little reason to expect employment
practices to differ from those operating in other Swedish firms. On the other
hand, where international integration is modelled around practices experi-
enced by the firm in its foreign operations then domestic workforces will
be subject to the introduction of new working practices. More generally, a
surge in foreign direct investment by large firms may be a force for change
in the nature of structures and patterns of employment relations in the
domestic economy. Thus, the questions are of interest to policy makers, too.
We investigate these issues through examination of data gathered from
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transfer of practices within MNCs has largely concentrated on “forward
diffusion”—the diffusion of practices from the home country to foreign
subsidiaries—but has tended to ignore the diffusion of practices in the
opposite direction, a process that has been termed “reverse diffusion”
(Edwards 1998). This can take two forms: first, “strict” reverse diffusion
in which a practice is diffused from a foreign to a domestic plant with the
other operations in other countries unaffected; and, second, reverse diffu-
sion as a subset of a wider process of “flow” diffusion in which a practice
originates in one of the foreign subsidiaries and is subsequently diffused
to all the other plants, including those in the home country. We show how
the case study firm has adopted practices experienced in its foreign opera-
tions and deployed these in other parts of the firm. This process has eroded,
though not removed, the influence of the Swedish system on employment
relations in the multinational, with the British and American systems
appearing to exert a growing influence. We explain the findings with
reference to managerial perceptions of the strengths and weaknesses of
different “national business systems”: Whitley (1992: 6) defines these as
“configurations of hierarchy-market relations that become institutionalized
in different market economies in different ways as a result of variations in
dominant institutions.”
In the following section, we consider the key features of, and changes
in, the Swedish business system in general and its employment relations
system in particular. The article then seeks to establish the room for ma-
noeuvre that MNCs have in diffusing practices across borders. In the fourth
section, we present the evidence from the mini-case study, which is then
located in an analysis of comparable studies of MNCs in the discussion.
THE SWEDISH BUSINESS SYSTEM AND THE CHALLENGE
OF INTERNATIONALIZATION
The system of employment relations that existed in Sweden for most
of the post-war period, termed “centralized self-regulation” by Kjellberg
(1998), originated from the 1938 Saltsjobaden Agreement. Against a back-
ground of the social-democratic government threatening greater legal in-
tervention to solve the problem of high levels of industrial conflict,
employers and unions reached agreement on a range of formal elements to
the system, such as new grievance procedures and greater regulation of
industrial disputes. A supplementary step was to implement a system of
highly centralized, economy-wide pay bargaining. Perhaps more impor-
tantly, though, was the informal understanding that was fostered by the
agreement, in which both employers and unions accepted the need to co-
operate to promote economic growth. Both parties saw the opportunity to119 THE EROSION OF THE COUNTRY OF ORIGIN EFFECT
realize gains, but also acknowledged the need to make sacrifices as a part
of this understanding. The newly strengthened central union confederation,
the LO, was willing to accept “socially responsible” pay rises as the price
for being able to pursue a “solidaristic” wages policy which aimed to mini-
mize pay differentials. Individual employers, on the other hand, were pre-
pared to accept the loss of control over pay-setting that centralized
bargaining involved in return for the assurances of industrial peace and
the guarantee of not being undercut by low-paying competitors.
More generally, there were mutual benefits to a system that closed off
the option of securing profitability through cutting labour costs, forcing
unproductive firms to close or rationalize and promoting a process of “dy-
namic modernization” (Iversen 1998) which rewarded high-tech, efficient
firms. The process of dynamic modernization was facilitated by two addi-
tional factors. First, the state developed an “active labour market” program
designed both to ease the redeployment of labour from one sector to another
and also to facilitate corporate strategies that relied on a highly skilled
workforce. Second, Swedish firms enjoyed a stable system of finance that
provided the platform for long-term investments, with ownership of large
Swedish firms being concentrated among a small number of investment
groups, banks and wealthy families, such as the Wallenberg empire which
is a key long-term shareholder in all large Swedish firms except Volvo.
1
In sum, the formation of this system was the result of an “historic compro-
mise” which, in the words of Coates (2000: 96), constituted a “quite unique
class accommodation.”
One of the distinguishing features of Sweden in this period was that it
was characterized by high levels of economic growth and low levels of
inequality and unemployment. Large firms appeared not to be handicapped
by high labour costs and, remarkably, given the size of the country, in most
industrial sectors Sweden possessed at least one leading company in inter-
national markets: Volvo in automotive; Electrolux in consumer goods; Astra
in pharmaceuticals; and so on. However, in the last two decades, economic
performance has been much less favourable. Economic growth slowed to
levels below the OECD average and unemployment, which had previously
been below 3%, rose in the early 1990s to around 10% and stayed just
below this level for most of the decade. For firms, productivity growth
1. This concentration of ownership is coupled with a system that distinguishes between two
types of shares, with A shares having greater voting rights than B shares. Since the
Wallenberg and other large shareholders principally hold A shares, their influence over
company decision making is even greater than the size of their stakes would suggest
(EIU 1999/2000). As a result, Swedish firms have not suffered from the “uncommitted”
relationship between shareholders and firms, which has impeded attempts by British firms
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was unfavourable in the international context, undermining the competi-
tive position of Swedish firms in world markets. While the performance
of the economy created pressure for change in employment relations, the
internal tensions within the model were already apparent.
One such tension concerned the corollary of the centralization of au-
thority within the LO, namely the weakness of unions at workplace level.
Responding to pressure from their members, the unions successfully lobbied
the government for legislation designed to increase unions’ influence over
workplace issues. Consequently, the principle of self-regulation was aban-
doned as legislation relating to a range of issues, including job security
and co-determination, was introduced. The co-determination law of 1976
was of particular significance since it required employers to negotiate with
unions over proposed changes to issues such as working hours and
conditions of employment. Private sector employers were opposed to the
law initially but, in 1982, reached agreement with the unions on the nature
that co-determination should take, accepting “the need to involve union
workplace organization in order to increase productivity” (Kjellberg 1998:
106). Arguably, this legal change reinforced and institutionalized a tradition
of consulting over, and negotiating, changes in work organization.
A perhaps even more significant tension was the way the system of
centralized bargaining, and the moderate wage increases that it produced,
meant that the ability of highly profitable firms to pay high wages was not
fully utilized. Thus the unions instigated moves to secure a greater share
of profits through the creation of “wage earner funds,” which were an
attempt, short-lived as it turned out, to channel profits into union-controlled
accounts. In essence, this represented an attempt to renegotiate the historic
compromise in a way that employers found unacceptable (Coates 2000).
Against this background, large Swedish firms became openly hostile
to the system of employment relations. In particular, employers sought to
free themselves from centralized pay bargaining, which many perceived
as posing serious constraints on their ability to set pay levels in accordance
with the performance of individual sites and to use pay to promote quality
and flexibility (Kjellberg 1998). This was particularly the case for firms
seeking to replace piecework systems with new forms of work organization
based on teamwork (for example, see Berggren 1993 on Volvo). More
generally, employers sought to erode the tripartist traditions of the model
and also campaigned against the growth of the public sector and the high
levels of taxation it entailed, arguing for the neo-liberal economic policies
that had become vogue in much of Europe and North America.
At the same time, large Swedish firms stepped up their internationali-
zation strategies. Foreign direct investment from Sweden has increased
rapidly in the last two decades. In 1980, the stock of outward FDI from121 THE EROSION OF THE COUNTRY OF ORIGIN EFFECT
Sweden amounted to less than $4 billion; by 1999 this had increased to
more than $104 billion. As a percentage of all FDI, this represented a
trebling, from 0.7% to 2.2% (UN 2000). Many Swedish firms have a long
international history because their small home market led them to expand
abroad at an early stage in their development (Hedlund 1981). The recent
surge in FDI means that many are now much more highly international-
ized than ever before: firms like Volvo and Electrolux employ more than
half of their workforces outside Sweden, while others such as Astra and
Pharmacia have merged with foreign firms. Many large Swedish firms,
therefore, became much less concentrated in their country of origin. Hyman
(2000) has described the internationalization of “national capital” and the
challenges this has posed for national systems of employment relations.
As he put it, “The most dramatic instance, perhaps, was the case of Sweden:
the major employers in effect ‘joined’ the EU long before the country’s
formal accession, and demolished the classic centralized ‘Swedish model’
of industrial relations the better to pursue more company-specific and
internationalized employment policies” (2000: 8).
Of course, MNCs are strongly influenced by the business system in
the country in which they developed. This is the case even for the most
internationalized MNCs which still tend to raise finance and conduct R&D
primarily in their home base, and also fill senior managerial positions with
home country nationals (e.g. Ruigrok and van Tulder 1995). Accordingly,
there is a detectable country of origin effect in most MNCs. Stressing the
firm roots that most MNCs have in their domestic business system, and
the influence these roots exert, is not to suggest that the country of origin
imposes a straitjacket on management, forcing all MNCs from a particular
country to be alike. Factors such as the ownership patterns of firms vary
from one company to another, while the influence of key individuals, par-
ticularly founding families, in the development of firms is a further force
for heterogeneity within a country. Nonetheless, the nature of dominant
institutions in the home business system informs the behaviour of MNCs
to a greater or lesser degree, creating general tendencies by nationality in
the way they manage their international workforces (for a review, see Ferner
1997).
However, as MNCs become more geographically dispersed, they have
increased scope to draw on elements of other business systems, adopting
and diffusing practices perceived to be superior to those in place in the
domestic operations. For Swedish MNCs, the combination of the apparent
dissatisfaction of senior managers with elements of the domestic employ-
ment relations system, the small domestic market and the internationaliza-
tion of capital has created considerable potential for this process, which in
earlier work we have termed “reverse diffusion.” The process is evident in
a number of recent studies of MNCs, to which we return in the final section.122 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES / INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, 2001, VOL. 56, N
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Before examining the case study evidence, we consider the freedom for
manoeuvre that management in MNCs enjoy in attempting to diffuse prac-
tices across their international operations.
THE DIFFUSABILITY OF EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES
ACROSS BORDERS
The character of the different business systems in which MNCs operate
influences the scope which managers have to transfer practices across their
international operations. The ease with which a practice can be transferred
across borders is determined in part by the extent to which it is dependent
on supportive and distinctive extra-firm structures. These extra-firm struc-
tures include the legal framework of employment relations, the nature of
labour market institutions and the attitudinal and behavioural norms that
characterize employment relations in a particular country. All employment
practices, of course, are to some extent dependent on these legal, institu-
tional and cultural supports, which we refer to here as “props.” The ease
with which a practice can operate outside its original home environment—
in other words, the extent to which a practice is “diffusable”—is deter-
mined in part by its dependence on these props.
One area in which practices may be highly dependent on such props
is training. Some aspects of a firm’s approach to training are dependent on
supportive institutions, a good example of which is the “dual” system of
training in Germany. The role of the colleges and training bodies in
administering, monitoring and certifying the system provides a crucial un-
derpinning for firm-level practices. Consistent with this, Dickmann’s (1999)
study of German multinationals showed that they have been constrained
in their attempts to introduce German-style vocational training into their
UK subsidiaries because the British economy lacks the “broader business
institutions necessary to underpin particular practices” (Edwards and Ferner
2000: 7). Of course, some training practices, particularly those that are
employer-led, are more diffusable in that they are less dependent on a set
of supportive institutions (see Edwards 1998 for a discussion of a British
MNC).
The nature and distinctiveness of the national business systems in which
MNCs operate can also limit the diffusion of practices in a different sense.
Managers at the HQ of a multinational may seek to operate a practice in a
number of countries but might be prevented from doing so by the legal,
institutional or cultural “constraints” of the country to which the practice
is directed. Organizational actors in the recipient unit of a multinational
may try to resist the introduction of a practice and may use their legal
powers, rights provided by institutions, or appeals to the importance of123 THE EROSION OF THE COUNTRY OF ORIGIN EFFECT
local “custom and practice” in order to thwart the HQ’s plans. In this sense,
some practices may not be “diffusable” because of the constraints posed
by the nature of the host business system.
One area where such constraints are notable is in relation to work or-
ganization. There is clearly significant scope for MNCs to diffuse prac-
tices in this area; the literature on Japanese firms, for instance, shows that
they have been innovators in lean production, taking practices such as
cellular manufacturing and JIT to their foreign subsidiaries. However, the
constraints posed by business systems do limit a multinational’s freedom
of manoeuvre in this area. Changes to work organization have to be nego-
tiated with employee representatives in most countries. Accordingly, Ortiz
(1998) has shown how unions at Opel Spain were able to significantly
influence the way that teamwork operated. As a result of union influence,
team-working was introduced on a one-year experimental basis with
workers only being a part of it if they so chose, while maintenance workers,
who had been opposed to the initiative, were eventually excluded.
In many instances, these constraints are partial rather than absolute:
that is, managers at the HQ may be able to diffuse a practice, but it may
need to be altered so that it can be implemented in the new business sys-
tem. As Edwards and Ferner (2000: 10) put it, a “practice may not operate
in the same fashion in the recipient as in the donor unit but, rather, may
undergo transmutation as actors in the recipient seek to adapt it to pre-
existing models of behaviour, assumptions and power relations.” Thus the
formal substance of a practice may be diffused but the operation of this
practice may differ between countries.
One illustration of this process is the diffusion of Japanese manage-
ment techniques. Broad (1994) has shown how the British managers in a
UK transplant of a Japanese multinational resisted moves by the parent
firm to shift responsibility for quality to teams of operators, preferring to
retain the right to take decisions in this area themselves. Broad (1994: 58)
argued that this reflects the “traditional obsession of British managers with
prerogative and secrecy.” In this case, “Japanese” practices were diffused
but took on a different form in the new environment. A further illustration
of transmutation is in the area of corporate culture. In recent years a number
of German MNCs have adopted aspects of the business cultures of the US
and the UK, such as “mission” and “value” statements. These statements
survive the transition partially in tact, in that the language remains the same.
However, the significance of terms such as “shareholder value” in the
German context is quite different where shareholders are commonly family
members or banks which have held long-term stakes, rather than the un-
committed and distant shareholders which dominate Anglo-Saxon firms.
Ferner and colleagues have termed this process “Anglo-Saxonization,” but124 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES / INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, 2001, VOL. 56, N
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argue that it has occurred “in the German manner” (Ferner and Quintanilla
1998; Ferner and Varul 2000).
Differences between national business systems, therefore, limit the
diffusability of employment practices. This is partly because practices are
dependent on the “props” present in the system in which they originate,
and partly because their introduction to other countries is subject to the
“constraints” posed by the recipient systems. We have also seen how prac-
tices can be modified, or “transmuted,” to fit the new environment. How-
ever, it is the differences between national business systems that also create
the potential for cross-border diffusion in the first instance, as MNCs seek
to gain a competitive advantage through transferring practices perceived
as delivering improved performance across their operations. One possibility
in Swedish MNCs is that senior managers have looked abroad for solutions
to their perceived problems at home.
One area in which Swedish MNCs may have sought to do so is ap-
praisal and reward. The narrow differences in earnings between and within
occupational groups that resulted from the “solidaristic wages policy” of
the LO was something about which management had become uneasy by
the 1980s (Kjellberg 1998). As we argued above, many large Swedish firms
expressed the desire to link pay more directly to firm-specific factors in
general and to use pay to promote quality and flexibility in particular.
Therefore, it is plausible that Swedish MNCs have looked to their foreign
subsidiaries for new appraisal techniques and systems of variable reward.
One example is varying pay so that it is linked to individual performance,
which is measured against specified objectives. Such “performance-related
pay” (PRP) schemes were pioneered in the US and, to a lesser extent, the
UK in the 1970s and 1980s (Sparrow and Hiltrop 1994; Storey 1992).
Another example is profit related pay and share option schemes that are
linked to the achievement of specific organizational targets. Whether such
performance management practices are diffused across Swedish MNCs,
and if so, the way in which such practices operate in Sweden are questions
of great importance.
A second area in which Swedish MNCs may have looked abroad for
new practices is management development. Historically, senior managers
in Swedish MNCs appear to have adopted an informal management style,
allowing subsidiaries considerable autonomy. Hedlund (1981) has described
this as a “mother-daughter” structure in which the heads of subsidiaries
reported directly to the group president, with the subsidiaries rarely being
integrated into the business divisions in the home country. The increas-
ingly integrated nature of the international economy and the competitive
pressures it poses has raised the issue of how the geographically dispersed
units are to be integrated with each other. In looking for ways of controlling125 THE EROSION OF THE COUNTRY OF ORIGIN EFFECT
and coordinating their international operations one possibility is that sen-
ior managers have looked to Anglo-Saxon firms, which have long between
characterized by a more structured and formalized management style. Many
Anglo-Saxon MNCs have managed their operations through the develop-
ment of a cadre of international managers with experience of different coun-
tries (Ferner and Varul 2000). The way in which these managers were
trained, selected, appraised and remunerated is likely to have been of con-
siderable interest for senior managers in Swedish MNCs. The extent to
which practices relating to management development are based on those
characteristics of Anglo-Saxon firms is, therefore, a second important area
for investigation.
These two areas, performance management and management
development, are ones that formed the focus of the case study. We consider
the way in which the multinational had adopted practices in these areas
that had originated in their foreign subsidiaries. In so doing, we are sensitive
to the role of the “props” and “constraints” posed by aspects of national
business systems in limiting and shaping the process of diffusion. It is to
an analysis of the case study data that we now turn.
THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE COUNTRY OF ORIGIN
EFFECT IN PRACTICE
The case study firm, Swedco, is a major Swedish multinational, pro-
ducing high-tech manufactured goods and employing tens of thousands of
employees. It is around one hundred years old and has operated interna-
tionally for most of this time. During the last two decades the company
has gone through a period of international expansion so that it is now highly
internationalized, selling about 95% of its products abroad in over one
hundred countries. Furthermore, more than half of Swedco’s workforce is
employed outside the home base.
The primary research instrument in the case study were semi-struc-
tured interviews with key respondents. These were conducted with three
managers and a union official in the corporate HQ in Stockholm and a
manager in each of the Belgian and British subsidiaries. The interviews
lasted between one and three hours and focused on the firm’s approach to
performance management and management development. These data were
supplemented with analysis of documents and secondary sources, such as
shareholder listings and annual reports. It is acknowledged that this is a
“mini case study,” involving a relatively small number of interviews. How-
ever, the data do have significant strengths: the interviews were lengthy
and open-ended; the documents supplemented the interview data in
important ways; and the firm possesses certain characteristics that mean126 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES / INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, 2001, VOL. 56, N
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we can see it as a “critical case” of how the country of origin effect has
evolved in Swedish MNCs.
The characteristics which accord Swedco the status of being a critical
case partly relate to its organizational features. In particular, the firm pos-
sesses all six of the corporate characteristics identified by Edwards (2000)
as promoting “reverse diffusion”: it is structured around international
divisions; has a low degree of diversification; production is integrated
internationally; there is a high degree of global spread; growth has been in
part through acquisition; and it is mature in the sense that it has operated
at the international level for a long time. Based on a study of British MNCs,
Edwards showed how these features of multinationals made it more likely
that senior management would have the motivation and the scope to draw
on practices developed in the foreign subsidiaries. Since the process of
reverse diffusion challenges the influence of the country of origin, these
corporate characteristics make Swedco a particularly interesting example
of the way in which the country of origin effect is eroded over time.
The other reason why Swedco can be seen as a critical case is its na-
tionality. Many elements of the Swedish business system create conditions
in which we might expect the country of origin effect to have been eroded
by influences from other countries. First, the size of the domestic economy
has meant that many large Swedish firms are highly exposed to interna-
tional markets and have extensive international operations. Second, as we
have seen, employer dissatisfaction with some of the distinctive structures
within Sweden, particularly the tradition of solidaristic, centralized pay
bargaining, have created fertile grounds for new practices to be diffused
from elsewhere. Third, traditions of management style within Swedish
firms, such as the team-oriented nature of decision making, mean that
Swedish MNCs are likely to be favourably disposed to outside influences.
Thus national as well as organizational factors shape the incidence and
process of reverse diffusion and the way in which the country of origin
endures or is eroded.
The research revealed a distinctly Swedish element to management
style, which was particularly evident in relation to the firm’s approach to
supervision, the character of hierarchical relations between occupational
groups and the nature of communication within the firm. In international
context, Swedish workers operate with relatively little direct supervision;
indeed, there is no direct translation in Swedish for the word “supervisor”
(Anderson 1995: 72). Swedish firms appear to have been at the forefront
in the use of semi-autonomous teams. For instance, Berggren (1993) argued
that the development of team working at Volvo enhanced the autonomy of
workers and increased their influence over the pace and nature of their
work. The legal and institutional context in Sweden, particularly the system127 THE EROSION OF THE COUNTRY OF ORIGIN EFFECT
of co-determination which reinforces union-channel workplace
participation, provides a supportive context for such practices. In Swedco,
the manager of international assignments described the company’s attempts
to spread a “democratic” approach throughout the multinational and saw
this as contrasting with approaches found in other countries:
I want to let my guys loose. I don’t want to control them and stand behind
their backs. This is typically Swedish, to be a coach. When something goes
wrong I have to go in and correct it and so on, but we are all part of a big
team. … I think some people, some of the English people over here, have a
small problem understanding how we can be so democratic.
Related to this “democratic” approach is the team-oriented approach
to relationships in which it is acceptable to “bypass the hierarchy”
(Anderson 1995: 77; Hedlund 1981). Accordingly, one of the British
managers in Swedco testified to the way this aspect of management style
was present beyond the Swedish operations:
The company encourages a Nordic approach to openness. Swedes think nothing
of jumping the hierarchy to put forward their ideas. They say to you “I didn’t
come to you because I know that you had to go to him anyway.” Some British
people find it irritating, but personally I like the style because it encourages
people not to be intimidated by a formal chain of command.
The way in which Swedish managers strive for consensus and co-
operation, what Anderson (1995: 76) terms the “quest for accord,” was
also evident. Arguably, one instance of this tradition is the “historic com-
promise” of the 1930s described above, while the institutions created at
this time were predicated on an assumption of compromise and conces-
sions in industrial relations. Daun (1989, cited in Berglund and Lowstedt
1996) argues that Swedes are distinguished by open communication which
increases the scope for a consensus to be reached (see also Lawrence and
Edwards 2000). This resulted in an expectation that disagreements would
be worked through in a calm, orderly manner. One of the Belgian managers
saw this as contrasting with his own home country approach:
I sometimes find it very frustrating as a non-Swedish HR manager that I always
have to be professional, diplomatic and avoid waves. I believe that there are a
number of cases when you can’t do that. You cannot always agree or compro-
mise. Sometimes you have to say no. In Belgium, we raise our voices, we
explode sometimes. But Sweden says this is something you must not do.
The distinctiveness of the Swedish business system shows up in other
characteristics of the firm. The stability of ownership enjoyed by Swedish
firms has enabled senior management to preserve Swedco’s independence
in an industry increasingly characterized by consolidation through mergers.
This is despite 50% of the shares being held by individuals and institutions
outside Sweden; the distinction between A and B shares means that the128 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES / INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, 2001, VOL. 56, N
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three largest Swedish shareholders possess only about 7% of the company
but control almost 75% of the voting rights. Swedco itself has grown mainly
through investment in new, “greenfield” sites and through a series of col-
laborative joint ventures and friendly acquisitions rather than through the
hostile takeovers which are characteristic of large Anglo-Saxon MNCs.
The Swedish business system has also shown itself to be conducive to com-
petitive success in sectors requiring high levels of investment. Swedco
appears to have benefited from this, operating in a high-tech industry with
one quarter of its workforce employed in research and development.
There is evidence, therefore, of a distinctive Swedish element to man-
agement style that the company has attempted to spread throughout the
company via expatriate assignments and international management training.
This management style aims to encourage creativity, team working, open-
ness of communication, the sharing of ideas and consensus in decision
making across borders. Interestingly, when this distinctively Swedish style
operates at the international level it favourably disposes the company to
learning about systems and practices operating in other countries. The
consequence is an apparent paradox: the country of origin effect favourably
disposes the firm to the influences of other national business systems rather
than closing off these influences. In this respect, the “Swedishness” of the
firm encouraged the reverse diffusion of employment practices. Accord-
ingly, there was evidence that practices in the areas of performance man-
agement and management development had been identified in the foreign
subsidiaries and diffused across the firm.
Given the highly competitive nature of Swedco’s industry and the high
skill levels of its workforce, a particular HR challenge is to recruit and
retain skilled engineers and managers. One way in which the company has
dealt with the challenge is by developing “flexible” or “variable” com-
pensation systems. Such systems, which include bonuses, profit sharing
and convertibles, are becoming more popular in Swedish firms (Berglund
and Lowstedt 1996; EIRO 2000). In Swedco, one element of this has been
the bonus systems that are linked to individual and company performance,
which have been developed by an international policy-working group. One
illustration is a debentures option program for 500 key staff globally, in
which a bonus linked to base salary is paid if a pre-determined profitability
target is met. In addition, for very senior managers, there is a “Short-term
Incentive Plan” which focuses on the achievement of short-term goals, a
practice which is characteristic of large Anglo-Saxon firms. Bonus systems
are not confined to senior staff, however, as three years ago all employees
obtained the right to subscribe to a convertible debentures scheme, some-
thing that about 40% of staff world-wide have taken up.
As well as this “bonus” scheme, Swedco has also developed an
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pay. Many observers have argued that PRP schemes were most prevalent
in the USA and have spread to Europe as the interest in “HRM” grew (e.g.
Sparrow and Hiltrop 1994; Storey 1992). An individual performance
appraisal system was introduced more than a decade ago, the purpose of
which was to measure employees’ abilities against a “competence devel-
opment plan.” Recently, these appraisals have assumed greater importance
as they are now linked to an individual PRP scheme that affects all
employees. The scheme comprises a framework developed at headquar-
ters, which is then adapted locally to allow for the constraints posed by
the business system in question. In fact, the company has been relatively
unconstrained in implementing the scheme with even collective bargaining
posing only a minor constraint. In the UK, the company’s negotiations with
its one recognized union sets only a low annual pay rise, allowing man-
agement to vary the rest of the rise according to the performance of indi-
vidual employees. In Belgium, the system of sectoral bargaining leaves
some scope for PRP at organizational level because the sector level rise is
very low. The company works council does not pose constraints to the
operation of PRP either, as they do not deal with issues of pay
determination. And, crucially, in Sweden too there have been relatively
few constraints on the introduction of PRP. This was partly because of the
union’s ready acceptance of PRP, which was described by a union official:
In Sweden the trade unions have been very positive about change and we have
tried to develop with the company. The trade union no longer wants decision
making power. We want to negotiate and consult, but we don’t want the power
and the conflict.
The weakness of these constraints reflects the changing nature of em-
ployment relations in Sweden. One important development has been the
decentralization of bargaining, which has allowed employers greater flex-
ibility to link pay to performance. Associated with this is the weakening
of the LO’s “solidaristic wage policy” in recent years, resulting in a wid-
ening of pay differentials, particularly for white-collar workers (Kjellberg
1998). A further factor making it easier for Swedish firms to introduce
PRP is the changing attitudes of younger workers who more readily accept
the principle of greater wage differentials between individuals. Our
respondents identified this as being particularly important in Swedco with
its relatively young workforce; half of the employees are 35 or under. The
findings provide an interesting contrast to Ferner and Varul’s (1998) study
of German MNCs in which regulatory and institutional factors heavily
constrained the adoption of an Anglo-Saxon style performance manage-
ment system, requiring a significant modification to fit in with elements
of the German business system.
A similar process of adopting Anglo-Saxon practices was evident in
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in recent years to develop a cadre of managers from across the multina-
tional, with the subsidiaries given the role of identifying and nurturing non-
Swedish employees as part of the international managerial workforce. As
the Swedish HR manager explained:
The subsidiaries are putting forward more candidates now than they used to.
They are improving. If you look at the number of candidates, the majority are
still from Sweden, but you can see an increase in the numbers coming from
abroad. By the time the next generation is in place, I think it will have turned
around.
Recently, the firm has established a “Corporate Executive Team” that
operates from four offices, only one of which is in Sweden while two are
in the US and one in the UK. This coexists with a “Management Institute”
that has the role of assessing and training managers from across the firm
who have the potential to fill senior roles within the firm. This is part of
the firm’s approach to succession planning, which involves the
identification of future senior managers, known as “high potentials.” As
the Swedish HR manager put it:
We have a group of 3 or 4 people from the management planning department
who go around the world every year to every local company to make an
evaluation of their management planning system. They ask, “what have you
done? what kind of people have you identified? what plans do you have for
these people?” So here in Sweden we know that the subsidiaries are doing it
the right way.
The approach to assessing and training managers appears to reflect
the influence of Anglo-Saxon multinationals. The identification of “high
potentials” as part of an international cadre of managers is, according to
Ferner and Varul (1998: 34), a common trait of British and American
MNCs. In Swedco, the British subsidiaries appeared to have been particu-
larly influential in the formation of the policy on management development.
The manager of the Management Institute, a Swede, confirmed the
important role of the UK subsidiary and UK universities in assisting her
in policy development on training programs and management development:
When I am developing a training program for managers, I always include the
UK. Firstly, it ensures that I get the language right but, secondly, there are a
lot of good training and management development ideas in the UK that I would
like to benefit from. I always bring someone in from the UK site onto the
team. We are also developing links here in Sweden with the UK universities
such as Cranfield and the LSE. They have good management training and
methodology. We also talk to UK professors regarding what will happen in
the future and what is going to be interesting.
In implementing this approach, Swedco appears to have undergone a
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MNCs. However, while the German firms appeared to modify the “Anglo-
Saxon” approach to fit the German business system, Swedco appeared to
be less constrained. For instance, in some of the German MNCs, there was
a culture of secrecy surrounding the handling of “high potentials” who were
not advised of their status in order to fit in with the egalitarian culture of
the German firm. In contrast, within Swedco, no such modifications were
made, with respondents in all three sites confirming that their high potentials
were made aware of their status from the outset so as to motivate them to
“develop themselves.”
How best can we understand the role of national business systems in
the process of diffusion at Swedco? The evidence demonstrated that the
practices in the two areas of employment relations studied, performance
management and management development, were not highly dependent
on a set of supportive “props” from the countries in which they originated.
Moreover, the introduction of these practices into the domestic operations
was not significantly constrained by the nature of the Swedish business
system. Hence, the “diffusability” of the practices in question was high,
and there was relatively little in the way of “transmutation.” Of course,
the picture may well be very different for other areas of employment
relations, such as work organization, employee representation and disci-
plinary and grievance procedures, where the props and constraints may
limit the scope for diffusion to a greater extent.
In sum, while the influence of the Swedish business system over the
case study firm was clearly visible, there is evidence that this has been
eroded over the last decade or so. This can be assessed in terms of the
perceptions of senior managers in the company of the strengths and
weaknesses of the different business systems in which they operate. Our
evidence suggested that senior managers in the firm perceived the USA
and the UK as providing practices in the areas of performance management
and management development that were seen as desirable. Practices from
the two Anglo-Saxon countries were diffused across the firm’s international
operations, including those in the home country. Indeed, Swedco is highly
exposed to the Anglo-Saxon system: it makes substantial sales in the large
American and British markets; it has 15% of its total employment in these
two countries, including divisional head offices and R&D sites; a third of
the firm’s shares are traded on the London and New York stock exchanges;
and it has entered into a series of joint ventures with American firms.
Thus the firm has undergone a process that has much in common with the
process of Anglo-Saxonization of German firms referred to above, and it
is a comparison with other studies of MNCs which forms part of the dis-
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DISCUSSION
It is clear that MNCs continue to be firmly embedded in, and strongly
influenced by, their country of origin. In many cases, MNCs benefit from
this because the depth of their contacts in the domestic business system
enable them to exploit its strengths. Thus expertise concerning systems
and practices with which the firm has familiarity in its home base can
constitute a source of competitive advantage for international firms (Porter
1990). Indeed, Porter and colleagues argue that Swedish MNCs “are
dependent upon Sweden as the dynamic diamond for their specific tech-
nologies and products” (Solvell, Zander and Porter 1993: 213). This
embeddedness, therefore, results in a distinctive country of origin effect
in the management of HRM. Yet the country of origin will not always pro-
vide systems and practices that senior managers in MNCs seek to deploy
on an international basis. Where the domestic business system is perceived
as being weak, the firm may look abroad for new practices. Its own inter-
national operations mean that it is partially embedded in other business
systems, of course, giving the firm the mechanisms to draw on a different
set of practices. In this way, “reverse diffusion” may occur in those areas
where the home country does not provide an attractive model.
Solvell, Zander and Porter’s (1993) description of Swedish MNCs
charts the way in which many have made limited moves to draw on the
strengths of the business systems in which they have foreign subsidiaries,
but also shows how the Swedish business system has shaped this process.
As they put it, the “successful tapping of foreign diamonds was selective,
and could not have worked without the support from a dynamic home base”
(1993: 197). This diffusion of practices from the foreign subsidiaries shows
up clearly in a detailed study of ABB, the Swedish-Swiss multinational,
which revealed that while the firm was still influenced by its original roots
this country of origin effect had been eroded markedly. Bélanger et al.
(1999: 258–259) describe the firm as an “Americanized European-based
company” that is “trying to implement American ideas.” They went on:
“On the global level ABB’s culture is corporate, cosmopolitan, but as we
keep emphasizing, Americanized.” The evidence from Swedco is consistent
with this. It suggests that the company looked abroad for practices that
enhanced flexibility in pay and appraisal and in developing managers. In
these two areas, senior managers appeared to view “Anglo-Saxon” prac-
tices as having the potential to provide the sorts of practices that they were
seeking. Of course, the process of adopting practices from foreign sub-
sidiaries will not have been felt so strongly in all areas, particularly those
where the constraints to diffusion are stronger, such as employee repre-
sentation and work organization, which are strongly influenced by the legal
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Moreover, we have seen how it was the very Swedishness of the firm,
particularly its “democratic” management style and openness of commu-
nication, which exposed it to outside influences. This presented an inter-
esting paradox; the distinct country of origin effect promoted the process
of learning from other countries, which in turn eroded the country of origin
effect. Many classifications of different types of MNCs assume that a strong
country of origin effect is incompatible with the adoption of practices from
overseas because the country of origin effect results in the diffusion of
practices across borders flowing from the home base to foreign subsidiaries
rather than vice versa. For instance, one category in Perlmutter’s (1969)
typology is “ethnocentric” firms in which home country systems and
practices are assumed to be dominant and home country practices are trans-
ferred to foreign subsidiaries. A further category, the “geocentric” firm,
which attempts to build a common approach through an amalgamation of
practices from a variety of national systems, can only emerge as the
ethnocentric orientation is eroded. (Perlmutter also identified a further
category, the polycentric firm, which adopted a decentralized approach).
However, the case study demonstrated how the national influence from
Sweden—the small domestic economy, the structure of the business system
and the nature of managerial traditions—pre-disposed the company to
learning from foreign systems. In this sense, the country of origin effect
did not constitute an attempt to push Swedish systems and practices
throughout the firm. Rather, the country of origin effect comprised a basic
orientation that favourably disposed the firm to learning from foreign sub-
sidiaries, promoting a geocentric element to management style in the form
of the search for new practices. Thus in this case the country of origin
effect promoted, rather than impeded, the process of adopting practices
from abroad.
One way of making sense of the apparent paradox is to distinguish
between different ways in which national business systems inform the be-
haviour of MNCs. One level is the basic orientation of the firm, the key
values and assumptions that underpin management style; the other is the
nature of particular practices operating in the firm. In Swedco, the basic
orientation was strongly shaped by the firm’s domestic business and senior
management made a concerted attempt to spread this across their interna-
tional operations. This orientation was consistent with, and even promoted,
the search for practices from foreign business systems. In this sense, reverse
diffusion occurred “in the Swedish manner.”
Comparisons with evidence from other studies of MNCs are revealing
in four respects. First, the nature of practices that MNCs look to diffuse
from their foreign subsidiaries (the “substance” of reverse diffusion) is
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of the systems and practices of the country of origin as the basis for inter-
national operations. Thus the “Anglo-Saxonization” of German MNCs
occurred in relation to organizational structures, control systems and man-
agement development, areas in which the German business system was
perceived as being an inappropriate model on which to develop greater
international integration (Ferner and Quintanilla 1998; Ferner and Varul
2000). A similar process is evident among many French MNCs (Mtar and
Quintanilla 1997). Evidence from British MNCs, in contrast, suggests that
where reverse diffusion occurs it is in the areas of work organization and
training, both of which are areas where the British economy and system of
employment relations has traditionally been very weak (Edwards 1998,
2000). Arguably, this is consistent with American MNCs in the automo-
tive sector trying to revolutionize work organization along the lines of Japa-
nese production. Hence, the substance of reverse diffusion varies according
to managerial perceptions of the relative strengths of the country of origin.
Second, the erosion of the country of origin effect is related to the
timing and stage of internationalization. German MNCs have been rela-
tively late at internationalizing, having relied until recently on exporting
rather than international production. Thus the process of Anglo-
Saxonization has been a recent phenomenon. In Swedco, however, the
process of adopting Anglo-Saxon style practices began a long time ago,
reflecting the much earlier development of international production. This
is not to imply that the erosion of the country of origin effect through reverse
diffusion can simply be read off from the length of time a firm has operated
internationally; many MNCs have operated at the international level for
decades but have not sought to integrate their operations and, consequently,
have not undergone the process of reverse diffusion. However, amongst
those MNCs under pressure to achieve a degree of international integration,
the “maturity” of their production or service provision process shapes the
strength of the country of origin.
Third, the evidence in this article suggests the need for a reconsidera-
tion of the concept of reverse diffusion. In other work on reverse diffusion,
the emphasis has been on diffusion within the boundaries of the multina-
tional. For instance, in Engineering Products, practices that were developed
and operated in the French, Spanish and American plants were identified
as being suitable for other units and were subsequently diffused across the
firm (Edwards 1998). Similarly, in many German MNCs, practices were
identified in the firms’ American and British plants, which took on the
role of a “vanguard” subsidiary (Ferner and Quintanilla 1998). In Swedco,
however, the practices that were diffused from outside Sweden were not
directly from their British or American subsidiaries but rather were from
the contacts to which these had given rise. For instance, the firm’s approach
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had established with UK business schools. Furthermore, Swedco’s link-
ages with the British and American business systems also enabled it to
engage in a process of benchmarking against Anglo-Saxon firms. Hence,
we distinguish between “internal” reverse diffusion in which practices
operate in the foreign subsidiaries before being diffused to the home
country, and “external” reverse diffusion in which practices are identified
in the business systems in which a multinational has units.
Fourth, the analysis is revealing in showing the links between different
sets of factors that promote reverse diffusion. As we noted above, Swedco
possessed all of the organizational characteristics identified in earlier work
as creating the conditions in which reverse diffusion is likely to occur. In
this paper, the main focus has been on the way in which its incidence is
shaped by the national influence—the size, structure and managerial
traditions of the home country business system. In particular, we argued
that many features of the Swedish business system promoted this form of
diffusion: the small size of the domestic market exposes Swedish MNCs
to foreign influences to a greater extent than in MNCs of other nationalities;
some structural elements of the system provide an incentive for firms to
look abroad for practices that can be deployed at home; and some Swedish
managerial traditions dispose senior managers in MNCs to learning from
other countries. These twin lines of analysis both have the potential to
further our understanding of reverse diffusion, but should not be seen as
mutually exclusive. For instance, the highly internationalized nature of
many Swedish MNCs is clearly related to the small size of the domestic
business system. Thus both organizational and national business system
characteristics, and the interaction between them, shape the incidence of
reverse diffusion.
Finally, to return to an issue raised at the outset, what are the
implications of this analysis for managers, employees and the wider
business systems in which they operate? In comparable multinationals, that
is those which are highly internationalized and integrated across borders,
this article suggests that senior managers are increasingly engaging in the
search for new practices from other countries and that they are doing so
through the creation of management structures capable of identifying and
diffusing practices. The evidence presented here adds to a growing body
of work that shows that in MNCs based in continental Europe this process
results in managers being assessed, paid, trained and selected for promotion
in ways that are characteristic of large Anglo-Saxon MNCs. These changes
may present opportunities to some managers but will also present challenges.
The same is true for employees, too, of course. In particular, Anglo-
Saxon style performance-related pay appears to have eroded the narrow
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highlights the differing levels of performance among individuals within a
work group. The implications for employees in Sweden and elsewhere in
Europe are serious given that even in Britain the evidence on PRP in prac-
tice demonstrates that it rarely has a motivating effect on a workforce. The
diffusion of variable forms of pay also presents a challenge to unions; the
evidence demonstrated that the role of collective bargaining over pay was
being eroded. Arguably, the diffusion of such practices compounds the
difficulties that many unions have in negotiating with multinationals, par-
ticularly the threat of relocation that management is able to use in order to
gain acceptance to the introduction of new practices.
The consequences for the domestic business system are also of
considerable potential importance. Specifically, the erosion of the country
of origin effect in MNCs could be a force for change in the home country
system as a whole. Whitley (1999: 20) has argued that “MNCs from dis-
tinctive and cohesive business systems with strong associated institutions
governing economic activities may well become more complex and dif-
ferentiated as a result of FDI—and so encourage novel forms of co-
ordination to develop—but are unlikely to change their fundamental
characteristics.” The findings in this article support this view, but only to
a point. There is a growing body of evidence showing that MNCs from
Germany, France and Sweden, which certainly possess distinctive and
cohesive systems with strong institutions, do indeed encourage novel
employment practices to develop. However, MNCs that are striving to
achieve a high degree of integration in their processes of international
production or service provision are also likely to spread these across their
operations. Accordingly, the evidence demonstrates that these innovations
have a significant impact on the home country operations of MNCs in some
areas of employment relations. This erodes, but does not eradicate, their
fundamental characteristics. In a country where large multinational firms
are particularly influential in terms of employment and output such as
Sweden, we might expect these innovations to have a significant impact
on the wider business system.
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RÉSUMÉ
L’érosion de l’effet d’origine du pays : le cas d’une
multinationale suédoise
Au cours des deux dernières décennies, les capitaux suédois ont connu
une internationalisation rapide, créant ainsi en général un défi significatif
au caractère distinctif de l’économie suédoise et au système de relations
industrielles en particulier, incluant son système centralisé d’autorégulation.
La présence conjointe du caractère hautement internationalisé des
capitaux suédois et du caractère distinctif du système d’affaires interne fait139 THE EROSION OF THE COUNTRY OF ORIGIN EFFECT
en sorte que les multinationales suédoises constituent une intéressante étude
de cas de la façon dont ces multinationales sont enchâssées dans leur culture
d’origine et sont façonnées par cette dernière. Dans quelle mesure et de
quelles façons ce caractère distinctif du pays d’origine influence-t-il les
multinationales dans la manière dont elles gèrent leur main-d’œuvre à l’in-
ternational ? Comment cet effet d’origine a-t-il évolué au fur et à mesure
que l’investissement étranger s’accroissait ? En particulier, comment cet
effet s’est-il détérioré suite à l’adoption de pratiques empruntées à d’autres
systèmes de relations industrielles ?
Nous avons étudié ces enjeux en procédant à une analyse des données
recueillies d’une mini-étude de cas d’une grande multinationale suédoise.
L’étude de cas a nécessité la conduite d’entrevues en profondeur auprès
de répondants au siège social en Suède et dans les succursales en Belgique
et au Royaume-Uni. L’analyse porte sur deux aspects de la relation d’em-
ploi, en l’occurrence, la gestion du rendement et la formation des cadres.
Elle montre comment l’entreprise a adopté des pratiques qui avaient cours
dans ses activités à l’étranger et qu’on retrouve maintenant à l’échelle de
l’entreprise. Ce processus a miné, sans la supprimer cependant, l’influence
qu’exerce le système suédois des relations industrielles au sein de la mul-
tinationale, alors que les systèmes britanniques et américains semblent avoir
une influence croissante.
Ces conclusions s’expliquent par une référence aux perceptions que
les dirigeants se font des forces et des faiblesses de certains systèmes d’af-
faires nationaux et elles se retrouvent dans un ensemble de travaux sur les
multinationales qui montrent que beaucoup de ces entreprises s’engagent
dans un processus que nous qualifions de « diffusion inversée ». C’est un
processus qui implique la diffusion des pratiques en prenant comme départ
les succursales à l’étranger et comme point de chute le pays d’origine : un
concept que cet essai élabore sous quatre aspects.
Dans un premier temps, nous maintenons que la nature des pratiques
que les multinationales suédoises cherchent à diffuser de leurs succursales
à l’étranger (la substance du processus d’inversion) se trouve largement
influencée par les perceptions que les dirigeants se font des faiblesses des
systèmes et des pratiques qui ont cours dans le pays d’origine en tant que
la base des opérations à l’international.
Dans un deuxième temps, l’érosion de l’effet du pays d’origine est
reliée au moment et au stade de l’internationalisation. Dans un troisième
temps, nous faisons une distinction entre la diffusion inversée interne et
externe, la première en référant aux pratiques qui ont cours dans les suc-
cursales étrangères elles-mêmes, avant de connaître une certaine diffusion
dans le pays d’origine. La dernière renvoie à des pratiques identifiées dans
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unités d’affaires plutôt que dans les opérations mêmes d’une entreprise en
particulier. Enfin, nous montrons comment des influences à la fois natio-
nales et organisationnelles façonnent les conséquences d’une diffusion
inversée en soutenant que ces deux ensembles de facteurs sont intimement
liés. Les implications d’un tel phénomène sont soulignées en considérant
les employeurs, les employés et les décideurs publics.